Supply Shock versus Demand Shock
On the whole, new market-rate housing appears to beneft not just the region but also the local neighborhood. Tis suggests that market-rate housing should be an important part of any solution to the housing afordability crisis. Fears of increased rents near new buildings should not prevent governments from implementing desired reforms to regional housing supply.
We note two important caveats to our fndings. First, we estimate an average efect that may disguise variation across diferent types of buildings and neighborhoods. Amenity and reputation efects are highly subjective and may vary widely depending on the local context. Second, the buildings in our sample are in the types of places that developers historically have wanted to build. While these areas are central to the debate, the efects may be diferent in other types of neighborhoods. For example, developers rarely build market-rate units in very low-income areas with high vacancy rates, so our results do not speak to what would happen if they did.
Notes

1.
A census tract is an area with about 4,000 people.
Our migration data contain one less
year than our rent data, so we shif the buildings we study back by one year. 
Efects of Unemployment Insurance Reforms in Brazil
Christopher J. O'Leary, Túlio Cravo, Ana Cristina Sierra, and Leandro Justino Veloso
Te Brazilian unemployment insurance (UI) program was established in response to a severe economic recession in the 1980s. It is now the largest UI program in the Latin America and Caribbean region, with more than 40 million benefciaries between 2012 and 2016. Despite its size, the program operates in a labor market where more than one-third of all employees work in informal jobs not covered by UI. Because these latter workers receive no benefts when they are separated from their jobs, formal sector employment is desirable, and previous research has found signifcant fows of workers between the formal and informal sectors and back again, which UI receipt may facilitate. In particular, some employers may use UI to subsidize wages of workers they lay of and then recall afer UI benefts end. Some laid-of employees even continue to work informally in their prior jobs while receiving UI benefts (Van Doornik, Schoenherr, and Skrastins 2017) . Moreover, the UI program has historically been generous in terms of minimal eligibility requirements within the formal sector, which could further incentivize such back-andforth fows.
Tese features have made Brazil's UI program relatively expensive, and when a recession in 2014 further increased costs, the Brazilian government instituted reforms in the eligibility rules to contain future costs. We investigate the efects of two such changes in UI eligibility rules in 2015 that increased the work experience requirements for frst-and second-time UI applicants. While previous research estimated that these reforms signifcantly reduced layofs (Carvalho, Corbi, and Narita 2018), our analysis, which relies on more complete administrative records, fnds smaller overall reductions in layofs, with somewhat larger decreases for workers with a single prior UI beneft spell.
A Natural Experiment
Te recession that began in early 2014, coupled with the institutional features of Brazil's UI program described above, led to calls for reforming the system. Facing general budget difculties and anticipating a signifcant rise in unemployment, Brazilian President Dilma Roussef issued Provisional Measure 665 in late December of 2014, raising UI eligibility requirements for frst and second time UI claimants, efective March 1, 2015. Soon thereafer, the legislature passed a new law codifying eligibility
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n The Brazilian unemployment insurance (UI) program, established in 1990, is now the largest in Latin America.
n UI reforms in 2015 increased work experience eligibility requirements for first-and second-time UI applicants.
n We find reductions in layoffs are greater for workers with one prior UI spell than for first-time claimants.
rules nearly as strict as the provisional measure, and this law took efect on June 17, 2015. Brazil thus experienced two sudden changes in UI eligibility rules in 2015, although these changes applied only for workers on their frst or second UI application; rules for the third and subsequent applications were unchanged. Consequently, the reforms were targeted toward recent labor market entrants.
Specifcally, the reforms increased the minimum number of months of employment workers needed before they would qualify for the shortest beneft duration on their frst or second UI application. Prior to the frst reform, any UI applicant who had worked six months in the prior three years could qualify for three months of benefts (frst row of Table 1 ). Under both reforms, frst-and second-time UI applicants now needed longer recent work experience to qualify for the shortest potential beneft duration. For frst-time claimants, for example, the new minimum potential beneft shifed from three to four months, but the required work period increased from 12 to 18 months under the frst reform, before returning to 12 months under the second reform, a mere four months later. A summary of the work requirements for UI beneft eligibility under each set of eligibility rules is listed in the Table 1 .
Our evaluation focuses on shorttenure workers who were most afected by the changes in UI eligibility rules. Using data that contains tenure at the daily level, we contrast job layof rates for a treatment group of workers with at least 6 and less than 7 months of job tenure against a control group of workers with at least 5 and less than 6 months of job tenure. Under the initial regime, the treatment group with 6 months of job tenure was eligible for three months of UI benefts but frstand second-time applicants became ineligible for any benefts under both reforms. We estimate how diferences in layof risk between the treatment and control groups vary across the diferent regimes, an approach called diference-in-diferences. To isolate the impact of the reforms, we further adjust for diferences across individuals in their geographic location, calendar month in the data, and demographic characteristics.
Efects on Layofs
We fnd that the increase in work months needed for UI eligibility reduced employer layofs. For shorttenure workers with no prior UI applications, the frst reform reduced layof risk by 0.18 percentage points (from a base layof rate of 3.4 percent). Te impact of the second reform was larger, cutting layof risk by 0.41 percentage points relative to the period before either reform.
Among workers who had one prior UI application, the reforms had even stronger impacts, with the frst reform reducing layof risk by 0.9 percentage points (from a base layof rate of 4.0 percent), and the second reform by 1.05 percentage points.
While sizable, these efects are smaller than those implied by earlier studies that did not have as detailed data on the number of prior UI applications. When we approximate the methodology of previous studies by not accounting for the number of prior UI spells, we estimate a layof reduction from the frst reform of 0.35 percentage points, much smaller than earlier Program costs rose sharply with the recession starting in 2014 as more unemployed workers with sufcient experience drew UI benefts. estimates of 0.53 percentage points (Van Doornik et al. 2018) to 0.69 percentage points (Carvalho, Corbi, and Narita 2018) .
Reduction in Collusion
In the United States, UI benefts are fnanced by experience-rated employer taxes that rise with total benefts paid to an employer's former workers. Perhaps unsurprisingly, layofs are lower in states where UI taxes rise more quickly with experience-rating (Card and Levine 1994) . In contrast, Brazilian UI benefts are fnanced from general revenues, and neither employers nor workers pay specifc taxes to fnance the program. Consistent with this lack of implicit penalty for heavily using the system, Brazilian UI benefts appear to subsidize the fow between low-wage, short-term jobs and informal sector jobs, in some cases back and forth with the same employer (Doornik, Schoenherr, and Skrastins 2017). We fnd the eligibility reforms afected this behavior, too. For shorttenure workers with no prior UI claims, the probability of being rehired by the same employer within 4 to 10 months of layof fell by 1.3 percentage points afer the frst reform and 1.8 percentage points afer the second reform. For short-tenure workers with one prior UI claim, the frst reform reduced recall to the same employer by 1.7 percentage points, an amount similar to workers with no prior UI claims. However, the second reform did not appear to afect recalls for these workers.
Conclusion
We confrm results of previous research that Brazil's 2015 increases in UI eligibility requirements reduced Bank.
Figure 2 Both Eligibility Reforms Also Reduced Job Recall to the Same Employer
